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Abstract
Much of the literature on populism restricts itself to specific regional contexts. Due to
this approach, theories of populism have difficulty explaining cross-regional similarities
or differences (such as the prevalence of exclusive populist parties in Europe but inclu-
sive parties in Latin America). Using cross-regional data and exploratory case studies
from multiple regions, we provide evidence that the prevalence of populism in a given
party system is a function of both party institutionalization and electoral institutions.
The combination of these factors we term institutional hostility. In laying out our the-
ory we identify three ways in which populist parties enter party systems and contest
elections: populist entry, populist targeting and adaptation, and populist capture.
Introduction
Recent events, such as the referendum for the United Kingdom to leave the European
Union, the near election of a FPÖ candidate in Austria for President, and the election of
Donald Trump, have sparked a wide spread discussion of populism and its (perceived)
growing strength around the world. Elected officials and pundits within this discussion
often speak of the rise of populism as a recent phenomenon, but this view is inaccurate.
The presence of populism in both Europe and Latin America is nothing new. For
decades now, populist parties such as the FPÖ in Austria or the FN in France have
made steady electoral gains, while in Latin America populist parties and figures such
as MAS under Evo Morales in Bolivia or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela surged to power in
the 2000s. While the recent incidents of populism in electoral democracies is notable,
it is not unprecedented.
The presence of populism in Latin America and Europe is reflected in a large liter-
ature on the subject. Most of the work to date, however, has focused within a given
region, with little work which draws comparisons directly between populism in Latin
America and Europe, though with some important exceptions (Mudde, 2011, Mudde
and Kaltwasser, 2013, Hawkins and Silva, 2015). The study of populism in Europe
primarily focuses on radical-right populist parties (Betz, 1994, Mudde, 2007). In this
context, populists have generally secured some electoral gains or survived multiple elec-
toral rounds and boast relatively organized and coherent parties. Research on populism
in Latin America, on the other hand, often focuses on individual populist leaders who
are associated with parties that are far weaker and more ephemeral than their European
counterparts (Conniff et al., 2012). We draw on these cross regional differences within
a comparative framework to explore the factors that shape both the fortunes and forms
of populist party politics.
We argue that the magnitude of populists’ success and the way in which populism
manifests is dependent on what we call institutional hostility. Institutional hostility is
a concept that captures the space within the political system for new populist parties,
and is a function of: a) the degree of party institutionalization and b) the electoral
institutions. Where parties are more institutionalized, the effectiveness of populists
appeals diminish because existing parties are able to use their organizational prowess
to mobilize both masses and elites for electoral gains. Likewise, Where the electoral
system is more restrictive, populist parties will find it difficult to enter the electoral
arena and win seats. Together these factors shape the hostility of the party system to
populist challengers.
The pattern of institutional hostility also shapes the way in which populism is likely
to manifest in a political system. At the highest levels of hostility, populist parties
will be rare. At low and moderate levels hostility populism tends to manifest in one
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of three forms. Where the electoral system is permissive and existing parties are weak,
populist parties can enter as mainline competitors for a large share of the vote. Where
the electoral system is permissive but existing parties are institutionalized, populist
parties are generally relegated as niche players in the party system. Finally, where the
electoral system is restrictive but parties themselves are weakly institutionalized then
the rise of populists is likely to come from factional challenges within existing parties.
To evaluate this argument we first use descriptive statistics to demonstrate that
an association between institutional hostility and populist party success exists in both
Western Europe and Latin America. We then use case studies along with quantitative
data to illustrate how levels of and shifts in institutional hostility shape the success and
pattern of populist party competition.
Our paper proceeds as follows: First, we provide greater background on populism
in these Western Europe and Latin America. Next, we review the contested concept
of populism and argue for an ideational, rather than material, conceptualization. After
conceptualizing populism, we introduce our theory of how the the degree of institutional
hostility shapes populism within a party system. Following our theory, we outline
our research strategy and present quantitative and qualitative data to support our
hypotheses. The purpose of this paper is to establish the plausibility of this argument
and suggest areas for further research. After presenting our data we summarize our
findings and conclude.
Background
Populist parties and the purported rise of populism has attracted the attention of a
growing number of scholars in recent years. In the European context scholars have fo-
cused on describing the characteristics and levels professionalization of populist parties,
explaining their level of success and durability, and analyzing the strategic interaction
between populist and existing parties. (Betz, 1994, Mudde, 2007, Bale et al., 2010, Art,
2011). For years, European populist parties had limited electoral success - usually func-
tioning as exclusionary peripheral parties garnering small shares of electoral support.
However, in recent years populist parties such as Syriza (Greece), Podemos (Spain), and
FPÖ (Austria), became major parties, won control of the government, and/or nearly
captured the presidency. While these examples remain exceptional cases, populist par-
ties throughout Europe have gained ground over the past decade and appear to be
expanding (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).
In general, populists and populist parties in the Americas have been more successful
at the ballot box than their European counterparts, frequently winning presidential
elections and capturing legislative majorities. There is a rich literature describing char-
acteristics of these populists and exploring the reasons behind their rise to power. These
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include responses to neoliberal reforms (Weyland, 1999, Roberts, 1995, 2013), ethnic, in-
digenous, or class grievances (Webber, 2011, Madrid, 2008), and the rise of charismatic
political leaders (Hawkins, 2003).
Figure 1 graphs the distribution of the presence of populism in party systems in both
regions. The figure makes use of recent work by Hawkins and Silva (2015) which weights
electoral results for parties in Latin America and Western Europe by the strength of
their populist rhetoric. A country’s weighted populist score can run from 01 to 100.2
Figure 1 illustrates that populism is more common in Latin American party systems
than Western Europe.
Figure 1: Distribution of Populism in Latin American and Western European Party
Systems
Most European party systems have populism scores under 20, while 20 is nearly
the modal score in Latin America. The variation of populism across Latin America is
quite striking. The strongest populist parties, by these criteria, are found in Venezuela,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Peru. These results should come as no surprise and
serve as a face validity check on Hawkins and Silva’s method. While some the most
populist party systems are found in Latin America, so too are some of the least populist
party systems. The latter include Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Hawkins and Silva,
2015).
What explains the variation of populism in party systems both within and between
regions? With important exceptions, most of the existing work has focused on single
country cases, or, if comparing more than one case, has remained within a single regional
1Party systems may receive a score of 0 for two possible reasons. First, parties that won any share of
votes were scored as using no populist rhetoric. Second, if any set of parties within the system employ
populist rhetoric but those parties receive no share of the vote the system’s score is 0.
2All parties in the system use strong populist rhetoric.
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context. Analysis of the variance in the electoral performance of populist parties within
and across regions has been comparatively under-studied. That is beginning to change
with recent work by the likes of Cas Mudde, Cristóbal Kaltwasser, Kirk Hawkins, Bruno
Silva, and others (Mudde, 2011, Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013, Hawkins and Silva, 2015).
These scholars have taken seriously the challenge of cross regional comparison and have
begun to develop theories and tools to help make such comparison possible. This paper
builds on these comparative approaches to present a genuinely comparative theory of
populist party success.
Specifically, we identify one factor that helps explain the variation in populist party
success. We argue that the variation in the success of populist parties is partially a
function of variation in institutional hostility. Institutional hostility refers to the extent
to which there is opportunity or space in the party and electoral environments for new
(populist) parties to emerge. As we discuss in more detail below, institutional hostility
is a product of system level, inter-party, and intra-party factors. We expect that as
individual political parties become more institutionalized and/or electoral institutions
become more restrictive (high institutional hostility), the probability that populist par-
ties will succeed diminishes, thereby reducing the expected payoff to adopting a populist
strategy. By contrast, weak or underinstitutionalized parties and/or the presence of
more permissive electoral institutions (low institutional hostility) opens the political
space for populist parties and appeals.
We argue that, shaped by the level of institutional hostility, populism manifests
itself in party systems in three ways: populist entry, populist targeting and adaptation,
and populist capture. Populist entry occurs when institutional hostility is low. Where
the electoral system is permissive and party institutionalization is sufficiently low, new
parties may enter and immediately compete with, or even outmatch, other parties in the
system. Populist targeting and adaptation occurs where permissive electoral systems
combine with institutionalized parties. In such environments populist parties can enter
but must adapt and evolve in order to compete with institutionalized parties. Lastly,
Populist capture occurs in environments where restrictive electoral rules combine with
weak parties. Where populists arise in such systems it will be by taking control of an
existing, factionalized party, rather than by entering as a new party. We discuss these
three patterns of populist contestation in greater detail later.
Populism: A Slippery Concept
Populism is one of the most contested concepts in the social sciences and is notoriously
difficult to apply consistently (Roberts, 1995, 2003, Hawkins and Silva, 2015, Weyland,
2001). Populism has frequently been associated with robust redistributive policies that
are set against global liberalism and is often employed by academics, pundits, and
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politicians as a euphemism for leftist policies. However, the resurgence of populism in
the 1980s and 1990s challenged the classical conceptualization of populism as populists
did not limit themselves to leftist policies (Weyland, 2001, Roberts, 2016). Fittingly,
debate on the formulation of populism as a concept in political science now centers on
two opposing notions of what populism is. On one side of the argument authors propose
a concept rooted in the form of elite-mass linkages and mobilization (Weyland, 2001,
Roberts, 2014). By contrast, the other approach focuses on the discursive rhetoric of
populists (Mudde, 2007, Hawkins and Silva, 2015).
The elite-mass linkages approach to populism posits that populism is not simply
tied to policy programs but instead to the nature of political organization. Under this
framework, populists gain electoral support by creating large, cross-cutting, hierarchi-
cal, yet unorganized bases (Weyland, 2001). Roberts (2015) argues that populism is a
top-down, elite expropriation of mass mobilization that elites exploit for electoral and
political gain. Roberts’ conceptualization of populism is deeply rooted in the Latin
American experience where populists step over the ashes of political parties whose
downfall was brought about by the decoupling of parties from society. In these in-
stances populists need only to push open an unlocked door into a party system where
existing parties can no longer able mobilize the masses through a party apparatus.
In light of the Latin American experience this conceptualization of populism has
merit. Because political parties in some Latin American states are relatively weak
(Levitsky et al., 2016) individuals can compete in the electoral arena without building
a party. Why pay the costs of building a party when you can mobilize the masses for
electoral gain without one? This conceptualization, however, encounters problems when
applied to European cases where political parties remain crucial to electoral success and
the elite subjugation of the masses is less pronounced.
Seeking to explain populism in Europe, Mudde (2007) writes from a tradition of
populism that appears quite different than the Latin American experience. The Euro-
pean experience with populism has a number of key distinctions that require a different
conceptualization of populism. First, and perhaps most importantly, European pop-
ulists differ significantly from their Latin American counterparts in that they tend to
develop robust party organizations. Another crucial distinction is the tendency of these
parties to be right-wing parties with a strong exclusive nationalistic bent. Exclusive
populist movements or parties seek to reinforce material, political, and symbolic dimen-
sions within certain social groups while inclusive populist parties or movements seek to
cross-cut material, political, and symbolic social groups (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).
To conceptualize populism in Europe, Mudde (2007) and Mudde and Kaltwasser
(2013) frame populism as a discursive concept. In this framework, populism is a view
of the world, expressed through discourse, with two opposing forces; the people - who
embody the moral good - and the corrupt elite who conspire against the people. Building
5
off of Mudde’s ideational concept, Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) define populism
as a ”Manichean approach to the political world that equates the side of Good with the
putative “will of the people” and the side of Evil with a conspiring elite” (2012, 2).
For Ostiguy (2009a,b, 2013) populism is not necessarily a construct of how the world
is viewed but a function of how the populist signals their closeness to the people. Ostiguy
(2013) argues that populists relate to the people by flaunting the low - behaving or
speaking in a way that sets them apart from the elite and allows them to be more closely
related to the people. By way of example, consider two well-known Western politicians:
David Cameron and Donald Trump. Cameron, an Oxford educated British politician
speaks and behaves like a member of the cultural elite and adheres to conventional rules
and procedures. Trump, by contrast, flaunts the low and appeals to ”the people” by
using coarser language and rhetoric filled with insults towards elites while dismissing
norms and institutions.
Somewhat related to Ostiguy’s approach to defining populism as a tool of signaling
proximity to voters, Moffitt and Tormey (2014), Moffitt (2016) seek to resolve discrep-
ancies between different conceptualizations of populism by framing it as a political style.
In this way Moffit defines populism as ”the repertoires of performance that are used to
create political relations” (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, p. 387).
For the purposes of this study we adopt the second, discursive conceptualization
of populism. We do this because it provides greater flexibility in comparing populists
across regions of the world than is otherwise possible with an elite-mass approach. By
adopting an elite-mass conceptualization of populism, we would limit ourselves to elite-
dominated mass movements which are rarer in areas of the world where politics are well
organized via political parties. We also do not favor one discursive conceptualization
over the other. A prima facie check of populists suggests that there is significant
overlap between the Manichean (Hawkins, Riding and Mudde, 2012) and flaunting-
the-low (Ostiguy, 2009a) types of populists. Often, in their attempt to construct a
Manichean framing of the world, populists seek to relate to ”the people” in an effort to
set themselves apart from the traditional elites.
Populism’s Party Problem
Many explanations for the rise of populism have been put forward – with several cen-
tered on economic-focused explanations such as the growth of or backlash against glob-
alization (Mughan, Bean and McAllister, 2003, Swank and Betz, 2003, Kriesi et al.,
2006, 2008) or neoliberalism (Roberts, 1995, Weyland, 1999). While populist discourse
often refers to economic grievances, we agree with others that populism is chiefly a
political phenomena (Weyland, 2001, Roberts, 2014). Because populist is political phe-
nomena within electoral democracies we argue that populism is closely linked with the
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nature of political parties. While we are among the first to explicitly link populism
to party institutionalization, other scholars have certainly noted the role that parties
play in the rise of populism,3 particularly in Latin America. Ken Roberts, for example,
notes that bait-and-switch tactics used by party elites led to a programmatic delinkage
between society and parties and contributed to the rise of populist politicians (Roberts,
1995, 2012, 2013). While we use a different conceptualization of populism than Roberts,
we likewise view populism as highly influenced by the party system, specifically, the
degree of party institutionalization.
Like other scholars we view party institutionalization as having two main compo-
nents. First, institutionalized parties are characterized by value-infusion (Levitsky,
1998), meaning individual elites are willing to invest in the party to achieve their long
term goals and as a result parties tend to be robust, cohesive organizations with pro-
fessionalized staff and an establish label. Second, institutionalized parties have deep
societal roots, with strong and stable links to identifiable groups of voters (Mainwaring,
Scully et al., 1995). Together, high levels of value infusion and strong societal roots
produce institutionalized parties in which the short term particularistic interests of in-
dividual politicians are at times subordinate to the broader, longer term interests of
the party (Bizzarro, Hicken and Self, 2017).
How does the degree of party institutionalization influence populism? Where in-
stitutionalization is high would-be populists face an electorate that is already tied to
robust party organizations, leaving relatively few voters for populist entrants to mobi-
lize. By contrast, where voter ties with political parties are weak and parties themselves
ephemeral it is less costly for nascent populists to mobilize voters in support of their
cause. We develop this argument in more detail below.
In addition to the party system, we also recognize the role of the electoral system in
shaping the incentives and capabilities of proto-populist. Permissive electoral systems
provide a more welcoming environment for new entrants, including populist parties,
compared to restrictive electoral systems, ceteris paribus. We argue that party institu-
tionalization combines with the nature of the electoral system to shape the incentives
and capabilities of populists to mobilize voters and compete in the electoral arena. We
label the combined effect of the electoral system and party institutionalization as the
degree of institutional hostility. Institutional hostility shapes both the likelihood that
populists will compete and be successful, and the form that populist competition will
take.
Holding all else constant (economic environment, popularity of existing parties, pop-
ular disillusionment, etc.) the combination of these two factors shape the competitive
3Work on populism in Europe has also focused on how convergence to the center by mainstream
parties opened the door to radical right populist parties (Kitschelt and McGann, 1997, Abedi, 2002,
Mudde, 2007, Carter, 2011).
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environment and thus the opportunities for populists.4 To demonstrate how institu-
tional hostility shapes the environment we outline three ways through which populists
contest elections vis-á-vis existing parties in a polity: Populist Entry, Populist Target-
ing and Adaptation, and Populist Capture (See Table 1).
Degree of Institutionalization
Low High
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ss
Low
Low institutional hostility
(Populist Entry)
Bolivia, Spain, and Venezuela
Moderate institutional hostility
(Populist Targeting & Adaptation)
Austria and France
High
Moderate institutional hostility
(Populist Capture)
United States
High institutional hostility
(Populism is rare)
Table 1: Types of Populism Manifested in Party Systems
Low Institutional Hostility: Populist Entry
When party institutionalization and barriers to entry are low the institutional environ-
ment for populist parties is ideal. Populists can easily enter the system and capitalize
upon weak party-voter attachments and permissive electoral institutions. In short, we
argue that when institutional hostility is low this provides the best opportunity for
populist parties, and hence, we should expect populist parties to be more prevalent and
more electorally successful, ceteris paribus.
In cases where institutional hostility is low and political entrepreneurs enter the
party system using a populist strategy we expect these parties to be more inclusive
populist parties. Because voter linkages to pre-existing parties are weaker, entering
populist parties may build a cross-cutting coalition, inclusive of many factions from
the disaffected segments of society, more easily than in instances where pre-existing
party-vote linkages are stronger.
4Tavits (2013) explores how what she terms ”environmental hostility” shapes the organization and
party-building decision of new parties in post-communist democracies. Where environmental hostility is
high (e.g. where public sentiment is hostile or where parties are at a disadvantage in terms of resources
and reputation) parties have incentives to strengthen party organizations to compensate (p. 156).
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Moderate Institutional Hostility Due to Low Party Institution-
alization: Populist Capture
What are our expectations where institutions are only moderately hostile–either a com-
bination of weak parties with a restrictive electoral system, or strong parties with a
permissive electoral system? We start with a system where parties are weakly insti-
tutionalized but the electoral system makes new party entry difficult. Because of the
restrictive nature of the electoral system we expect the presence of populism in the
party system to be less common–nascent populist parties typically cannot enter and
capture large number of votes.
While rare, when populists emerge in this type of moderately hostile setting, the path
to power is likely to be an intra-party one. Namely, populist leaders or factions wrest
control of an existing party from other factions. Populist capture thus occurs when a
populist (either a party outsider or leader of an internal party faction) attempts to gain
control of the party, and non-populist party elites are unable to prevent the populist’s
rise. Where parties are highly institutionalized it is likely that party elites will be able
to coordinate to prevent such capture. However, where party institutionalization is
low, a lack of party cohesion makes it more likely that populist wings can successfully
challenge party elites.
Moderate Institutional Hostility Due to Permissive Electoral
Institutions: Populist Targeting and Adaptation
Where existing parties are institutionalized, the opportunities for what allows populist
parties to enter and survive in systems are limited. First, existing parties already have
high and durable levels of voter-party attachment, leaving relatively few unattached
or weakly-attached voters available for populist mobilization. Second, institutional-
ized parties typically have a professional and robust organization that is effective at
mobilizing their voters and beating back populist challenges.
However, where the electoral system is permissive, populist parties can find some
success by targeting limited segments of society where party linkages are weaker. Pop-
ulist targeting is typically accompanied by exclusive rhetoric and policy proposals aimed
at voters at the margins of the existing political system. These kinds of appeals limit the
appeal of these exclusive populists, placing a ceiling on their support, ceteris paribus. If
these new populists wish to compete against existing parties for more mainstream vot-
ers they must broaden their appeal and reduce the strength of their populist discourse.
We call this strategy populist adaptation.
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High Institutional Hostility: Few populist parties
Should proto-populists seek to enter a system where institutional hostility is very high
because of high levels of party institutionalization and non-permissive institutions, they
are unlikely to succeed. Winning a significant portion of the electorate will be difficult
because it requires any new party to peel away a large number of voters that are
strongly linked to existing parties. In addition, due to the highly restrictive nature of
the electoral system they face the likely prospect of complete electoral failure with few
to no seats. Given the hostile nature of the institutional environment populists should
be least likely to emerge under these conditions.
Alternative Approaches
Our argument points to parties and electoral restrictiveness as a cause of (the lack of)
populism. We must also consider, however, that populism is actually a cause of party
weakness or de-institutionalization.
If populism is a cause of party weakening or party de-institutionalization this would
introduce a significant problem of endogeneity. In our model, we argue that parties
are influential political institutions that are the best instruments for organizing and
mobilizing voters. It is plausible that populism is actually a superior form of political
mobilization, and that the rise of especially talented populists, such as Hugo Chávez,
causes the collapse of existing parties. Whether party weaknesses causes populism or
populism undermines political parties is an empirical question that should be identified
by looking at the timing of the rise of populists, which we do below.
Our argument also implies a puzzle that we must grapple with: if low institutional
hostility allows populism to rise, why isn’t populism ubiquitous in systems with low
institutional hostility? If populism is such a potentially powerful electoral tool, why
then do we not observe more populism - especially where parties are weak? It is
important to remember that populism is only one of many strategies politicians can
use. Politicians may form parties, rely on personal wealth, use force, rely on clientelist
networks or business ties, use nativist appeals, or use populism. None of these strategies
are mutually exclusive and political entrepreneurs may use a mix of any set of strategies
they believe to be the most advantageous. The payoff of populism, then, is dependent
upon alternative forms of political organization and mobilization. Should alternative
forms exist, political entrepreneurs may substitute to or away from populism depending
on the instruments available to them.
Lastly, some may argue that the electoral strength of populists is dependent upon
popular sentiment. Without popular disillusionment, the message of populists would
ring-hollow. We agree that populist demand (i.e. popular disillusionment) may be a
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necessary condition and may help explain why populism isn’t ubiquitous. Even where
institutional hostility is low, if there is low demand for populism, populist parties will
not find much electoral success. Our theory does not dismiss this argument and is
actually complementary to it. Given a level of popular sentiment conducive to pop-
ulist mobilization, we argue that the opportunities for mobilization are a product of
institutional hostility. Even where there is demand for populism, the extent to which
populists can capitalize on populist sentiment is shaped by access to the system.
Research strategy
The implication of our argument is that we should observe less electoral success by
populists as institutional hostility increases. Our goal in this paper is not to precisely
estimate a causal effect. Rather we seek to to establish the plausibility of our argument
by presenting evidence of a link between institutional hostility and the presence of
populism in any given party system.
To establish this link we follow a two-step research design. First, we make use of
quantitative data. The purpose of this quantitative data is to move beyond mere de-
scription and demonstrate a cross-regional correlation between institutional hostility
(particularly the level of party institutionalization) and populism. Because of the dif-
ficulty of identifying the exogenous relationship between party institutionalization and
populism and data limitations, we choose not to use regression as any estimator will be
biased.
The second step in our research design is to use exploratory cases studies. The use
of case studies serves two purposes. First, using cases studies provides a more nuanced
view of the potential causal mechanisms through which variance in party institution-
alization and electoral institutions may lead to changes in the degree of system-level
populism. Second, case studies allow us to address the issue of endogeneity/reverse
causality. By using exploratory case studies we pay particular attention to the timing
of changes in the institutionalization of parties and the system as a whole vis-à-vis
changes in the electoral fortunes of populists.
Data
Populism
We measure populism using data from Hawkins and Silva (2015) (Hereafter HS). HS
treat populism as discursive and define it as discourse which treats politics as a dualistic
struggle between the (morally good) people and the (morally evil or corrupt) elite. To
measure populism, HS code party manifestos and selected speeches to produce a three
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point scale, ranging from zero to two. Zero indicates very little to no populism present,
one indicates the presence of populist rhetoric but tempered by non-populist elements,
and two indicates that a text is extremely populist. After coding is completed, scores are
then aggregated through a multi-step process to create a single measure that indicates
how prevalent populism is in a party system by weighting electoral results by each
party’s populism score.5
Party Institutionalization
To measure the average institutionalization of parties within the system, we use
new data collected by the Varieties of Democracy Project (Hereafter V-Dem), Our
primary measure of average party institutionalization, is V-Dem’s index of Party In-
stitutionalization (Hereafter PI) (Bizzarro et al., 2018). PI is an index created from
five party-related components: party organization, branches, linkages, distinct party
platforms, and legislative party cohesion.6 7
As an alternative way to operationalize institutionalization we employ a measure
of party strength developed by Bizzarro, Hicken and Self (2017). Party strength is
an index that measures the extent to which political parties are characterized by: (1)
permanent national party organizations, (2) permanent local party branches, (3) cen-
tralized mechanisms of candidate selection, (4) legislative cohesion, and (5) program-
matic (rather than clientelistic) linkages to their social base. The five indicators are
aggregated through simple addition to form a Party Strength index, reflecting the ex-
pectation that each element of the index is partially substitutable. The index is also
normalized on a 0 to 1 scale, with higher values associated with higher levels of party
strength.
We use these two measure of institutionalization to explore the correlation between
the average institutionalization or strength of parties within the party system and the
level of populism within the party system. Because the populism data is coded from
elections near the year 2010, we average the past 10 years of PI for each of the 25
countries available in HS .
Electoral System Restrictiveness
To proxy for electoral system restrictiveness we use a new measure of district magni-
tude provided by Selway and Self (2016). Selway and Self collected data on the district
magnitude which accounts for electoral systems with multiple tiers in selecting seats
for the legislature. Selway et al. measure the average district magnitude using the
5See Hawkins and Silva (2015) for a full explanation of how the data is generated.
6For further discussion of the process please refer to Bizzarro, Hicken and Self (2017)
7PI is normalized on a 0 to 1 scale, with higher values associated with higher levels of institutional-
ization. The V-Dem data includes observations for 193 countries with fairly regular coverage from 1900
to 2014.
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following formula below.
AvgDistrictMag =
(Seats1/Districts1)
Seats1/(Seats1 + Seats2)
+
(Seats2/Districts2)
Seats2/(Seats1 + Seats2)
We use the log of AvgDistrictMag as our measure of electoral system restrictiveness.
We emphasize that this measure is a proxy for electoral system restrictiveness. One
weakness of this proxy is that it does not account for the restrictiveness of the electoral
system at the executive level. Some presidential or semi-presidential systems use rules
that may make it easier for smaller parties to contest but this measure does not capture
this. Instead, we capture the restrictiveness of the electoral system at the legislative
level.
Case Selection
In addition to quantitative data, we use exploratory case studies to probe the mech-
anisms through which institutional hostility affects the presence of populism as well as
the direction and timing of this relationship. To explore the link between institutional
hostility and populism we have selected six cases in two regions: the Americas and West-
ern Europe. We have selected these regions to be consistent with our cross-national
quantitative analysis and because countries within these regions provide variation in
terms of the robustness of parties and party systems as well as the prevalence of pop-
ulism.
From the Americas we have selected Bolivia, the United States, and Venezuela. In
Bolivia Evo Morales captured the MAS party, melded it with his significant grass-roots
movements, and entered and came to dominate a relatively weak party system. The
United States has a restrictive electoral system with moderately institutionalized par-
ties. We focus on the 2016 U.S. election to demonstrate how populism can enter a seem-
ingly stable party system through an under-institutionalized party. Finally, Venezuela
is the quintessential story of populism in Latin America. Following significant political
upheaval during the 1990s, Hugo Chávez entered a weakened party system with a new
and weakly-institutionalized political party using his own brand of strong populism –
Chavismo.
In addition to the Americas we select three cases from Western Europe – Aus-
tria, France, and Spain. We select from Western Europe because the region is com-
monly associated with relatively strong and institutionalized party systems. Austria
and France each demonstrate how populist parties are largely disadvantaged in well-
institutionalized party systems. In both cases populist parties entered as fringe parties
and struggled to garner electoral support. Austria’s FPÖ and France’s FN parties have
found greater electoral success as they have evolved and contested elections with a di-
luted populist brand. In Spain, despite massive economic upheaval, long established
political parties have been able to maintain a significant hold on the electorate despite
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the rise of the new populist party, Podemos.
Cross-regional evidence
We begin by exploring whether party institutionalization helps us understanding vari-
ation in populism. As previously mentioned, we have merged data from V-dem with
cross-national data on populism from HS.
Table 2 summarizes the party and populism information for the two regions. On
average, European democracies have stronger, more institutionalized parties compared
to democracies in Latin America, and, as expected, this corresponds with less pop-
ulism, whether measured by the average HS populism score, or the average vote share
obtained by parties. We can get a better view of the relationship between party insti-
Table 2: Breakdown of Populism and Party System Attributes by Region
Variable Americas Europe
PI 0:70 0:95
Party Strength 0:62 0:80
Populism 22:32 8:94
Vote Share 26:71 16:27
tutionalization and populism by plotting Populism against our two measures of party
institutionalization, PI and Party Strength (see Figure 1). Both panels in Figure 2
shows a downward slope suggesting that as institutionalization increases, Populism de-
creases.
It is also clear from Figure 2 that populism varies more in the Americas compared
to Europe, with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela each having high levels of populism
while Mexico, the United States, and Uruguay each have low levels of populism. By
contrast, each European party system is relatively institutionalized and has low levels
of populism.8
Next, we add the electoral system to the picture by combining Party Strength and
the log of AvgDistrictMag to create an estimate of institutional hostility and plot the
countries from our sample in Figure 3. The horizontal line separates countries with
single and multi-seat constituencies. The vertical line represents the center of Party
Strength which has been normalized and centers on 0.73 - the median value of Party
Strength in the sample.9 Based on our theory, we expect the figure to resemble the 2x2
8Because of data availability Greece and Spain were omitted from this sample. We suspect that the
variance of Populism would increase should these be included.
9We use Party Strength here rather than PI because Party Strength incorporates information about
how much control party leaders exercise over their ticket, which allows us to distinguish between parties
systems with open primaries (e.g. the U.S.) and those without.
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Figure 2: Party Institutionalization or Strength and Weighted Populism Score
depicted in Figure 1. The most populist cases should appear in the upper-left quadrant,
where institutional hostility is low. Countries in the areas with moderate levels of insti-
tutional hostility should (upper right and lower left quadrants) should correspondingly
lower levels of populism, with populists entering as exclusive outsiders in the upper left
quadrant, and as intra-party populist insurgents in the lower left quadrant. Finally,
populism should be relatively uncommon where institutional hostility is high (lower
right).
Figure 3: Institutional Hostility and Populism in Party Systems
The pattern of data in Figure 3 largely corresponds to our expectations. The coun-
tries with the highest populism scores are nearly all located in the top left quadrant.
The average populism score for the upper left quadrant is 25.72–two to three times the
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score for the other quadrants. The upper right quadrant is home to mainly cases with
medium to low levels of populism. Populism is comparatively rarer in our single mem-
ber district cases, as expected, but it is more common where parties are weaker (i.e. the
U.S. and Canada), and rare where institutional hostility is high (bottom right). The
evidence also corresponds with our expectation regarding regional differences. Pop-
ulism in Latin America is largely due to low institutional hostility, whereas populism
in Europe occurs in an environment of strong parties and more permissive electoral
systems.
The two most prominent outliers in Figure 3 are France and Canada.10 This was
anticipated. Both countries have electoral systems that are more permissive than im-
plied by our simple measure of electoral system restrictiveness, AvgDistrictMag. While
France uses single member districts, it also uses multiple rounds in both its legislative
and executive elections, which makes the electoral system more permissive by fragment-
ing the party system (Birch, 2003). Thus, France would most likely be in the top-right
dimension were we to use a different measure of electoral system restrictiveness. Turn-
ing to Canada, the high level or regionalism in the party system has regularly provided
space for populist parties to enter and begin competing as regionally-based parties and
later nationalize through party mergers (Behiels, 2010). During these mergers there
is limited top-down control leading to a similar outcome, albeit a different process, of
party capture found in the United States.
Timing Populist Gains in Party Systems
As previously mentioned, the possibility of reverse causality is theoretically plausible
yet still an empirical question. Along with each of our brief case studies we use time-
series plots of PI and Party Strength to investigate the timing of the rise of populist
parties and address the issue of endogeneity. In each figure (Figures 4-6 and 7-10)
we plot the time-series of PI and Party strength next to each other for comparison of
within country time trends for each of the indicators. We plot the time-series for each
indicator for each country for approximately 25 years.11 along with the global average
for democracies12 in order to compare the country-year trend with the global-year trend.
We also highlight the years of the significant presence of populism in the party system
with a gray background.
10Chile is another possible outlier. Luna and Altman (2011) argue that the Chilean party system is
less institutionalized that it often appears in, which might account for its status.
11In the European cases of Austria and France we extend the time horizon by 10 years to account for
the first times that the FN in France and FPÖ in Austria became relatively competitive parties
12To calculate the average we selected all country years where polity2  6 and calculate the year
average for PI and Party Strength
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Case Studies
Because the quantitative data is not well suited for estimating causal effects we include
several illustrative case studies to provide a preliminary exploration of the timing and
type of populism present in these regions. We use these case studies to explore the causal
mechanisms behind how institutional hostility influences the presence of populism in
party systems. We also use these case studies to show how the strength of populism
can fluctuate over time as a function of institutional hostility.
Populist Entry
Venezuela
We begin our cases studies with the prototypical populist case - Venezuela’s Hugo
Chávez. Prior to Chávez’s ascendancy to the presidency in the late 1990s, the party
system of Venezuela had experienced a decade-long collapse, despite previously being
one of the most stable party systems in the region. If Venezuela had boasted one of the
most institutionalized party systems, how did it come to collapse?
Under pressure from the IMF and facing dire economic circumstances, Venezuela
began to implement neo-liberal economic reforms in the late 1980s. These reforms were
implemented by the AD (Acción Democratica) party after winning the 1989 election;
despite promises to avoid austerity (Dietz and Myers, 2007). This ”bait-and-switch”
tactic served to programmatically dealign political parties (Roberts, 2013). The frac-
tures in the party system began to show immediately in the next presidential election
as Rafael Caldera split from his previous party COPEI to run independently.13 Thus,
within a few short years neo-liberal reforms had opened the first major cracks into the
Venezuelan party system.
After a failed coup attempt and subsequent pardon, Hugo Chávez set to work or-
ganizing ”Bolivarian Circles” in 1994. These circles were loosely tied, non-hierarchical,
civic organizations that would later be critical to Chávez in mobilizing the electorate
(Hawkins, 2003, Roberts, 2006). Despite the presence and use of these circles, however,
Chávez never set out to develop these organizations into a well institutionalized party,
instead leaving them to function as a quasi-party that would help mobilize voters.
If Chávez lacked an institutionalized party, how was he able to defeat parties which
had had such a strong hold on the system? As discussed, the initial cracks to the
party system arose after the bait-and-switch tactics of parties in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Not only did the introduction of IMF reforms force parties to renege
on electoral promises, but neo-liberal reforms severely weakened corporatist linkages.
In addition to these reforms, however, economic decline - especially the decline of oil
13It is critical to note that all of this occurred well before Chávez contested an election.
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revenue - also undermined parties’ ability to make use of clientelistic linkages. This
weakening of both corporatist and clientelistic linkages helped hasten the collapse of
the existing party system (Roberts, 2003, 2007).
Due to the collapse of Venezuela’s party system Chávez faced little institutionalized
opposition. Thus, Chávez had little incentive to build his own institutionalized party
and was able to combine extreme populist rhetoric with the loosely organized Fifth
Republic Movement to easily defeat his weakened opposition (Hawkins, 2003). The
course of Venezuela’s party collapse as the harbinger of the rise of Chávez is depicted
in Figure 4 below. In the late 1980s and early 1990s both PI and Party Strength begin
to decline, providing an inviting environment for populist entry.
Figure 4: Venezuelan Party Institutionalization and Party Strength
Bolivia
Another participant in Latin America’s populist revival (Roberts, 2007) is Evo Morales
and his MAS party in Bolivia. The story of Bolivia’s party system is similar to that
of Venezuela’s. Following years of state-led economic intervention, neo-liberal reforms
played a critical role in undermining the foundation upon which political parties rested
by significantly weakening organized labor unions (Crabtree, 2013, Roberts, 2013).
From the mid-1980s, when neo-liberal reforms were first introduced, to Evo Morales’
victory in 2006, the electoral and party system in Bolivia was fraught with instability.
Following the neo-liberal reforms in the mid-1980s politics was characterized by
multiple parties and weak coalition governments (Crabtree, 2013). A new electoral sys-
tem introduced in 1995 further contributed to upheaval in the party system (Centellas,
2009). Overall, net electoral volatility rose from 27.5 from 1980-2000 to 50.7 during
2000-2010 demonstrating the collapse of the Bolivian party system (Roberts, 2013, pg.
1441). Indicative of this instability was the rise of new parties or previously peripheral
parties which garnered significant portions of the vote. The presence and success of new
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or previously peripheral parties is consistent with the low level of institutional hostility
in the Bolivian party system which set the stage for the rise of Evo Morales.
Years before he would ascend to the presidency, Evo Morales rose to prominence
as an organizer of coca unions. Following his capture of the previously defunct MAS
party, Morales capitalized on opportunities during the Water and Gas Wars to build
a larger movement that extended beyond coca growers (Webber, 2011). Using a new
form of ethno-populism, Morales fused together a new movement-party that cut across
multiple ethnicities which had previously acted autonomously. Using populism, Morales
was able exploit the weakness in the Bolivian party system and capture power.
Turning to Figure 5 we see that, overall, the Bolivian case fits our expectations
for a situation in which populism can succeed. With relatively low levels of party
institutionalization and a permissive electoral system new parties were able to enter
and contest elections with some success. We also see some evidence, however, that the
entrance of the MAS strengthened the fledgling party system.
Figure 5: Bolivian Party Institutionalization and Party Strength
Spain
Both the Bolivian and Venezuelan party systems are near or below the global average.
By contrast, party systems in Europe are relatively well-institutionalized. To what
extent do we observe populist competition in systems where parties are better institu-
tionalized? The case of Spain demonstrates that populists can compete and have some
success where the electoral system is sufficiently permissive. Figure 6 shows that both
PI and Party Strength are well above the global democratic average. Following the
merger of parties that created the PP (Partido Popular) Spain has been a fairly stable
two-party system with the PP and PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) garnering
a strong majority of the vote even with a fairly permissive electoral system. Following
a reform of the electoral system in 1985 both the PP and PSOE garnered sufficient
electoral support to maintain a two-party system despite Spain’s use of multi-member
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Figure 6: Spanish Party Institutionalization and Party Strength
Figure 7: Spanish Unemployment (2006-2016)
district proportional representation and a fairly large district magnitude of 6.73 (Selway
and Self, 2016).
The conditions in Spain since the 2008 global financial crisis were similar to those
that led to the rise of successful populists in Bolivia and Venezuela. Following the
financial crisis, unemployment rose steadily to an extremely high level (Figure 7). Yet
this large and persistent economic malaise didn’t immediately lead to any breakdown in
the Spanish party system. Instability only began after the center-left PSOE agreed to
austerity measures. Like other cases of populism in Latin America, the act of a leftist
party agreeing to austerity measures was a bait-and-switch tactic with the potential to
programmatically de-align the party with many of its followers (Roberts, 2013). In fact,
following the PSOE’s introduction of austerity measures a large-scale protest broke out
across the country and the party was eventually dealt a major blow, losing 15% of the
vote from the previous election. However, despite the magnitude of the protests and
the electoral defeat of the PSOE, the two-party system initially stayed intact with no
new parties challenging the PP or PSOE in 2011.
Despite the electoral hold PSOE and PP maintained, the links between voters and
the existing parties had been weakened as a result of the sustained economic crisis and
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the government responses to it. Figure 6 picks up this change, as PI and Party Strength
decrease sprior to the 2015 election. As the level of institutionalization declined, the
permissive electoral system allowed for the entry of new competitors. In both the
local and national elections of 2015, two new parties rose to prominence one of which,
Podemos, is very populist.
Given the political fragmentation after the 2015 election the parties were unable
to form a government and new elections were held in mid-2016. As can be seen in
Table 3 the electoral fortunes of the new parties’ (Podemos and Ciudadanos), as well
as PSOE, were largely unchanged, while the center-right PP made modest gains. Spain
demonstrates how populist parties can enter into what had been a well institutionalized
system. Following sustained and fairly extreme economic duress and a shift by the ruling
party away from their programmatic alignment with their voting base, space opened
for Spanish populists.
Table 3: Elections Results in Spain (2011-2016)
Party 2011 2015 2016
PSOE 28.76 22.00 22.66
PP 44.63 28.71 33.03
Podemos+ NA 20.68 21.15
Cs NA 13.94 13.06
In that less-institutionalized environment Spain’s permissive electoral rules opened
the door for a new populist party to enter. However, the high level of party institution-
alization presents challenges for this new populist party. It remains to be seen whether
Podemos can rely heavily on strong populist rhetoric to compete with institutionalized
parties. According to our theory the (still) high level of PI and Party Strength stand
as an obstacle to Podemos’ future success.
Populist Targeting and Adaptation
Austria
To demonstrate how institutional hostility dampens the presence of populism in a party
system we have selected the case of the FPÖ in Austria – one of the most notable cases
of populism in Europe today. The FPÖ was founded in 1956 by former members of
the Nazi party but was a minor party for most of its early life. The fortunes of the
FPÖ changed during the 1980s following a change in leadership. In 1986 Jörg Haider
became chairman of the FPÖ and quickly changed course. In an attempt to broaden
the appeal of the FPÖ, Jörg Haider abandoned the previous agenda and retooled the
party with a populist-nationalist blend which included a move to the right and strong
anti-immigrant sentiment.
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Figure 8: Austrian Party Institutionalization and Party Strength
Somewhat surprisingly the move to a populist-nationalist approach in order to
broaden the appeal of the FPÖ seemed to pay off. In the years following Jörg Haider’s
ascendancy in the party, the FPÖ started to make inroads within a highly permissive
system that had been previously dominated by two parties. Unlike the case in France,
the move to a populist strategy was successful because of lower levels of institutional
hostility in the Austrian system. Even though the Austrian party system boasted two
major and well institutionalized political parties (the SPÖ and the ÖVP), the nature of
Austria’s electoral system reduces institutional hostility. As in Spain, the presence of
proportional representation in Austria reduces the pressure towards a two-party system
and allows greater space for additional parties. In the case of the FPÖ, Jörg Haider
was able to find space in the electoral market by using a more expansive appeal with
populism. In this way lower institutional hostility, due to permissive electoral institu-
tions, has allowed the FPÖ to become a major party (moving from approximately 5%
of the vote to gaining 20.5% of the vote in 2013 National Council election and 46.2%
in the 2016 Presidential elections).
The success of the FPÖ is also a prime example of populist adaptation. Given
the permissive electoral system, populist parties were able to gain an early foothold
in the party system. However, the presence of highly institutionalized parties limited
the number of voters available for mobilization, relegating the FPÖ to minor party
status. Two things had to change in order for the party to broaden its appeal. First,
a decline in party loyalty over the 1970s and 1980s–not fully captured in our PI and
Party Strength measures, but well documented in the broader literature14 –provided a
set of unattached/weakly attached voters that new parties could target. Second, the
FPÖ had to adapt its rhetoric to appeal to a broader set of voters. Over the course
of the 1980s the FPÖ broadened and moderated its rhetoric. While the FPÖ certainly
14See Müller (1993) for a review of this literature.
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employs populist rhetoric, that rhetoric is less populist than many populist parties in
other cases – it falls at the midpoint in the index of populism created by HS, and well
below more radical populist parties such as the PVV in the Netherlands or the NPD in
Germany. This adaptation in a moderately hostile environment has allowed the FPÖ
to grow and become a major party in the system. However, the continued presence
of relatively institutionalized competitors places a lower ceiling on the FPÖ’s success
compared to what we observed in Latin America.
France
The FN in France also demonstrates how populist parties can adapt where institutional
hostility is moderately high due to the presence of institutionalized parties. When
speaking of populism in France, many scholars have focused their attention on the FN
(Front National) largely because of its success during presidential elections in the early
2000s. The FN entered the French party system following a decline in the average
strength of political parties in the mid-1980s (as can be seen in Figure 9). This decline
in party strength was the result of increased polarization within the system (Knapp,
2004), weakening links between parties and the population (Grunberg, 2008), and the
difficulties of adapting to European integration (Bornschier and Lachat, 2009). These
factors produced a small opening within the system that allowed the FN to enter.
Figure 9: French Party Institutionalization and Party Strength
Although the FN was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972, the FN first found
limited electoral success in 1986 and 1988. During the 1990s, the FN became more
ethno-centric in order to expand its base while at the same time building links to labor
unions and making use of state networks (Schain, 1999). The party’s fortunes declined
during the mid-2000s as Nicolas Sarkozy’s UMP moved to the right to co-opt some of
FN’s positions. Further problems arose for the FN as mainstream parties began actively
coordinating against the FN. This resulted in the FN’s poorest electoral performance
in 2007 with the party only garnering 4.3% of the vote in the National Assembly and
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10.4% in the presidential election.
Following the late 2000s decline, Jean-Marie retired and his daughter, Marine, be-
came president of the party. Marine’s professional image differs from father’s and
she has pursued a different electoral strategy. She immediately moved to adapt and
re-calibrate the FN to better compete in the party system. This included removing
extremely xenophobic content from the party platform and moving the party away
from the radical right (Shields, 2013) in a move to ”de-demonize” the party (Mayer,
2013).15 After Marine’s reforms, the FN reclaimed much of its lost support in the 2012
election. Like the case in Austria, the FN had to adapt to become more inclusive and
less populist in the face of institutional hostility
Populist Capture
United States
Populist capture is more rare than populist entry or targeting/adaptation and occurs
where there is a restrictive electoral system. In restrictive electoral environments, absent
system-wide de-institutionalization, the path for populist entrepreneurs is an internal
one–i.e. the capture of an existing party. For this to occur at least one party has to be
relatively weaker. The most recent example of this phenomenon is the populist capture
a political party in the United States by a political outsider – Donald Trump. The rise
of Donald Trump did not happen overnight and the dynamics that lead to his capture
of the Republican Party were in motion well before he entered the political scene.
As can be seen in Figure 10 the level of institutionalization varied greatly across our
two measures. Using PI the U.S. parties appear highly institutionalized. By contrast,
when measured with our party strength index, the parties appears relatively weak. This
difference is driven entirely by an indicator measuring centralized control of candidate
selection in the PS index and its absence in PI. Open primaries in the U.S. increase
intra-party divisions and provided a opportunity for populists to seize control.
15 Although the FN is commonly referred to as a populist party, the party’s manifesto and speeches
by Marine Le Pen are not heavily populist. Hawkins and Silva (2015) score (using 2012 speeches and
manifestos) the FN much lower on their scale of populism than many parties commonly thought of as
populist.
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Figure 10: U.S. Party Institutionalization and Party Strength
The growth of the Tea Party faction within the Republican Party marks the be-
ginning of the populist capture of the party. The presence of the Tea Party created
significant problems of collective action at the elite level which would eventually pre-
vent the party from coordinating against Donald Trump. The Tea Party wave of 2010
brought a new set of elites into the Republican Party who held candidate, policy, and
legislative preferences that were relatively distant from mainstream party elites. Given
the differences in preferences among party elite, intra-party coordination became more
difficult. Witness the lack of coherent policy responses by the Republican party vis-á-vis
the Democratic President. Instead of coherent policy responses, Republicans opted for
”obstructionism”. While many may view this as a selected strategy on the part of the
Republicans, we view this as a result of a party paralyzed by the inability to coordinate
elite preferences on policy.
The presence of the Tea Party faction in the Republican Party set the stage for
an bitter contest for their party’s nomination for the U.S. presidency. The presence
of 17 declared candidates for the Republican nomination signals a complete lack of
coordination on the part of party elites to select a small set of candidates. This created
an opening for a populist to take advantage of the party’s decentralized candidate
selection model and capture the Republican Party.
Donald Trump effectively employed populist rhetoric by flaunting the low; frequently
using non-elite style of behavior and rhetoric to stand apart from the career politicians.
Given the factionalized nature of the party, Republican elites were unable to coordi-
nate response to Trump’s populist strategy. After winning the Republican nomination,
Trump built on his flaunting of the low rhetoric and introduced elements of Manichean
populism–frequently referring to the Democratic Party, Hillary Clinton, and any non-
supportive Republican as corrupt or morally suspect.
After winning the nomination, Donald Trump inherited a party brand and organiza-
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tion, which he was able to use to mobilize voters. Mr. Trump’s share of the popular vote
is very similar to the same share previous Republican candidates have received in recent
history. Polls of voters demonstrate that, as in other elections, voters voted according
to their party identification, suggesting that it is unlikely that Trump’s populism was
key to his Electoral College victory.
To demonstrate that party capture was key, consider the counterfactual in which
Donald Trump tries to enter the electoral arena and challenge both parties as an in-
dependent. Mr. Trump would have had no established brand with voters nor any
organization to encourage potential supporters to vote. There is very little reason to
believe that Donald Trump could have captured the presidency as a true outsider. This
suggests that it was Donald Trump the Republican, not Donald Trump the outsider
populist, that garnered sufficient electoral support to win a majority of electoral college
votes and the Presidency.
Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to establish the plausibility of our theory which posits that
institutional hostility is central to understanding the electoral success of populism. We
do not argue that institutional hostility is the sole explanation of the success of populism
in elections, but we do argue that institutional hostility shapes the degree and pattern
of populist competition within a polity. We argue, further, that the rise of populist
parties take place via three paths, ceteris paribus: populist entry, populist targeting
and adaptation, and populist capture. Using cross-national quantitative data as well as
exploratory case studies, we come to a number of conclusions. First, as hypothesized
the presence of populism is correlated with institutional hostility - as measured by
the interaction between the average level of party institutionalization within a party
system and the nature of the electoral system. Where the level of institutional hostility
is higher we observe lower levels of populism within party systems. Second, populist
parties tend to enter or improve their electoral success after average strength of existing
parties decreases.
This finding is critical to addressing the issue of timing in the causal story of the
rise of populist parties. Instead of populism being responsible for the weakening or de-
institutionalization of parties, our evidence suggests that party weakening precedes the
rise of populism. Lastly, we find institutional hostility shapes the strategies of populist
entrepreneurs. In cases where electoral institutions are restrictive, populist parties
must either dilute their populism brand to increase their electoral appeal or capitalize
on party weaknesses to capture an existing party. When electoral institutions are more
permissive, however, populist parties can win power and influence and do not necessarily
need to dilute their brand of populism to appeal to more voters.
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The evidence provided in this paper provides support for our assertion that the
presence of populism within party systems is tied to the level of institutionalization of
other political parties in the system. Where parties within a party system are highly
institutionalization (on average) populism as a mobilizing strategy appears to be less
viable. The implication of these findings points to the necessity of incorporating the
party system into theories seeking to explain electoral fortunes of populist parties.
Simply stated, theories explaining the variation in the electoral fortunes of populist
parties should not separate populism from the party.
We also emphasize that populism is not a binary concept. While a wide variety
of parties or leaders can be referred to as ”populist”, the extent to which they rely
on populist organization or rhetoric varies. The key finding, however, is that higher
levels of institutional hostility decreases the payoffs of populism. In essence, political
entrepreneurs face a number of potential trade-offs when considering a populist ap-
proach to electoral competition. Parties matter – but when parties are weak, political
entrepreneurs can make use of populist rhetoric or organization to compete within the
electoral arena. While some populist movements are dominated by exceptional individ-
uals (e.g. Hugo Chávez), populist parties are still parties and function within a system
where they must compete against other parties.
We argue that party institutionalization is key to understanding the electoral success
and behavior of populist parties. By studying populism through the lens of political
parties we hope to answer four related questions. First, why is populism much more
pervasive in party systems outside of Western Europe? One key feature that distin-
guishes Western European party systems from their counterparts in other regions is the
degree of party institutionalization. We argue that systems with more institutionalized
parties provide comparatively less fertile soil for the seeds of populism. Second, what
explains why economic shocks give rise to populism in some contexts but not others?
We also argue that an implication of our theory is that party institutionalization may be
an important intervening variable between shocks and populist support. Third, what
explains why anti-elite distrust of institutions is represented by populism in many, but
not all cases where this sentiment is present? We argue that the explanation lies in po-
litical parties — where parties are institutionalized there is less space for proto-populists
to take advantage of popular disillusionment. Thus, while the disillusionment exists,
high levels of institutional hostility prevents new parties from entering and capitalizing
upon the distrust of institutions.
Lastly, why do some populist parties adopt inclusive strategies while others pursue
exclusive strategies? We contend that where party institutionalization is high, populists
are forced to appeal to limited segments of the population because many voters are
already firmly tied to a party – leading them to develop more narrow targeting strategies
which result in more exclusive appeals.
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